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COMMENTARY
The National Commission for the Review of Antitrust
Laws and Procedures: Reports on Symptoms but
Ignores Causes
Arthur D. Austin*
During the past decade Congress has vigorously supported antitrust with
new laws and bigger budgets.' The government has pushed enforcement "activ-
ism" to the outer limits while the number of private suits is increasing at expo-
nential rates. With optimism, a Nader lieutenant observes that we are witness-
ing "an outburst of significant antitrust reforms."'
Yet despite strong public support and high esteem among politicians, anti-
trust is a failing institution, collapsing under the weight of self-created chaos and
inefficiency.
Inscrutable decisions make it difficult for firms to distinguish "safe" methods
of competition from illegal conduct. Litigation is a mess. Defendants skillfully
use procedural ploys to delay and obfuscate the issues while frivolous private
actions, drain company resources and overtax the courts. Class actions seem to
benefit no one except counsel. An overburdened and perplexed judiciary suc-
cumbs to absurd liability arguments. In short, evidence mounts that the cost of
maintaining an antitrust system exceeds the assumed benefits.'
I. The Response of the President's Commission to Study Antitrust
In 1977 President Carter created the National Commission for the Review
of Antitrust Laws and Procedures with a charge to recommend ways to expe-
dite litigation, improve remedies, and to advise on the credibility of various im-
munities and exemptions.' The Commission heard extensive testimony from the
antitrust community, and analyzed various staff reports. It recommended that
measures be adopted to improve management of trials, that preference be given
* Edgar A. Hahn, Professor of Jurisprudence, Case Western Reserve University School of
Law; B.S., Virginia; J.D., Tulane Univ.
1 Examples include increasing the fines and criminal liability for Sherman Act violations,
requiring "open disclosure" of consent decree negotiations, premerger notice requirements, and
the creation of a parens patriae right of action for state attorneys general. For a discussion
of the new amendments see Fox, Antitrust Law, reprinted in 1978 CORPORATE COUNSELS
ANNUAL at 527-48; Kintner, Griffin, Goldston, The Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvement
Act of 1976: An Analysis, 46 GEo. WASH. L. Rnv. 1 '(1977).
2 Green, A Reform Era for Antitrust, N.Y. Times, March 27, 1977, § 3, at 1, col. 1.
3 Critical commentary is extensive. See Erickson, The Profitability of Violating the
Antitrust Laws: Dissolution and Treble Damages in Private Antitrust, 5 ANTITRUST L. &
ECON. Rxv. 101 (1972); Handler, The Shift from Substantive to Procedural Innovations in
Antitrust Suits-The Twenty-Third Annual Antitrust Review, 71 CoLuzf. L. Rav. 1, (1971);
Kane, The "Bounty Hunter" Objection to Antitrust Litigation, 9 DuQ. L. Rxv. 466 (1971);
Kirkham, Complex Civil Litigation-Have Good Intentions Gone Awry?, 70 F.R.D. 199
(1976); Parker, The Deterrent Effect of Private Treble Damage Suits: Fact or Fantasy, 3
Naw Max. L. Rnv. 286 '(1973); Wheeler, Antitrust Treble Damage Actions: Do They Work?
61 CAL. L. REv. 1319 (1973).
4 Exec. Order No. 12022, § 2(a)(1), (2), 3 C.F.R. 155 (1977), as amended by Exec.
Order No. 12052, 43 Fed. Reg. 15,333 (1978).
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to structural relief, and that there be revision of "attempt to monopolize" sub-
stantive requirements. The Report also suggested that more lenient standards
for granting injunctive relief be adopted and that Congress conduct hearings to
determine the consequences of legislation that would render size illegal without
proof of "exclusionary" conduct. (Not reviewed in this Article are the Com-
mission's recommendations on immunities and regulated industries.)'
In its concise evaluation of the management problems of "big case" liti-
gation, the Commission identified the major trouble spots and compiled a list of
corrective measures. According to the Report, time constraints, discovery con-
trols, more resolute use of summary judgment, and sanctions for dilatory tactics
would cut off enough procedural "slack" to render antitrust litigation manage-
able. These are indeed resourceful improvements and should be adopted.
An inherent defect in the proposals is that their application is discretionary
with the individual judge. Given these conditions, there is justification for doubt
over the likelihood of radical improvement in handling complex antitrust liti-
gation. The probability is that the past mirrors the future; intelligent and hard
working courts conduct efficient trials while the others perform commensurate
with their abilities. Moreover, even assuming modest success in control of liti-
gation through management techniques, the Commission proceeds to dissipate
its achievements by its treatment of substantive issues.
In recommending that structural relief be the preferred remedy in Sher-
man § 26 and Clayton § 77 actions, the Commission oversimplifies the diffi-
culties-and time-involved in determining the ideal state of competition in a
particular market and in drafting a feasible plan of dissolution to achieve that
goal. The Report offends few by suggesting "workable competition" as the goal
for structural engineering. Unfortunately for an already confused judiciary,
there are as many versions of "workable competition" as there are practicing
economists. In the words of one economist: "Lacking precise and agreed-on
criteria, definitions of workability often are tautological; they tend to be redun-
dant, stated in such a way that the definition adds relatively little to the meaning
of the term."'
Structural relief is obviously an important contribution to competition. The
Commission's approach is, however, somewhat casual and seems to assume away
the substantial negative trade-offs that must be balanced against less cumbersome
but effective conduct remedies. The degree of difficulty in devising a dissolution
plan, the chances of successfully rehabilitating the market, and the extent of the
drain on time and resources of all involved should be carefully weighed in deter-
mining the remedy. Judge Wyzanski, cited by the Commission as an advocate
of "workable competition," provides this perspective:
In the antitrust field the courts have been accorded by common con-
5 For a critique of the Commission's analysis of Antitrust Immunities and Economic
Regulation see Baker, Commission Report Puts Focus On U.S. Regulatory Role, The National
L.J., Feb. 19, 1979, at 23.
6 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1970).
7 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970).
8 P. AscH, ECONoMIc THEORY AND THE ANTITRUST DILEMMA 123 (1970). Asch con-
tinues: "The notion of workable competition may therefore be useful not so much as a guide
... but rather for the questions it raises." Id.
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sent, an authority they have in no other branch of enacted law .... They
would not have been given, or allowed to keep, such authority ... and they
would not so freely have altered from time to time the interpretation of its
substantive provisions, if courts were in the habit of proceeding with the
surgical ruthlessness that might commend itself to those seeking absolute
assurance that there will be workable competition, and to those aiming at
immediate realization of the social, political, and economic advantages of
dispersal of power?
The proposed revision of "attempt to monopolize" would inflate rather than
expedite litigation. Under the prevailing test, the plaintiff must prove that the
defendant specifically intended to monopolize with a dangerous probability of
success.'" Since most courts have held that only dominant firms can pose a
"dangerous probability" of achieving monopoly," a majority of the Commission
concludes that this test is too restrictive.
The proposed revision requires proof of "a dangerous risk of monopoly...
as determined after an evaluation of the defendant's intent, the defendant's
present or probable market power, and the anticompetitive potential of the
conduct.. ,,."
The Commission uses a new set of "buzz" words that will entangle lawyers
and judges in extended argument over interpretation. How, for example, does
a court ascertain whether, or at what point, a firm possesses "probable market
power"? Even hired "experts" will stumble on a vague term like "anticompetitive
potential." As Senator Hatch observed in dissent to this recommendation:
"Enactment of the proposed statutory amendment would create an entirely new,
untested substantive antitrust violation, enforceable by private parties, which
will leave the law confused for years to come.""
According to the Report, the "dangerous risk of monopoly" test is intended
to "avoid the implication that the term refers to a greater than 50 percent chance
that monopoly will occur."" This language seems to advocate a liability standard
similar to, but less onerous, than the "incipiency" or "reasonable probability"
of lessening competition or tending to monopoly test used under Sections 2, 3,
and 7 of the Clayton Act. 5 If the experience of the decisions under the Clayton
9 United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 348 (D. Mass.
1953). Wyzanski rejected the government's proposal to dissolve United into three separate
manufacturing firms as "unrealistic" and instead imposed conduct sanctions. Id.
10 L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW ON ANTITRUST 134-40 (1977).
11 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, 3 ANTITRUST LAW fl 831 at 336.
12 Report to the President and the Attorney General, ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP.
(BNA) 50 (Spec. Supp., Jan. 18, 1979) (Hereinafter cited Report). The remaining
portion of the revision states that "the fact that a defendant's prices were not below either
average variable cost or marginal cost shall not be controlling, but may properly be considered,
in assessing the defendant's intent and the conduct at issue." For a discussion of the antitrust
implications of "predatory" pricing strategy see Areeda & Turner, Predatory Pricing and Re-
lated Practices Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 HARv. L. Rav. 697 (1975); Areeda,
Scherer & Turner, Predatory Pricing Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 89 HARv. L. REv.
869 (1976); Posner, Exclusionary Practices and the Antitrust Laws, 41 U. CHI. L. REv. 506
(1974); Williamson, Predatory Pricing: A Strategic and Welfare Analysis, 87 YALE L, J. 284
(1977).
13 Report, supra note 12, at 99.
14 Id. at 44.
15 Section 2 (The Robinson-Patman Act) covers various forms of price discrimination. 15
U.S.C. § 13 (1970). Section 3 is the anti-exclusive dealing and tie-in statute, 15 U.S.C. § 14
(1970), while Section 7 applies to mergers, 15 U.S.C. § 18 '(1970). The statutory liability
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Act is any sort of guide to the future of the "new" attempt to monopolize viola-
tion, we can expect a sharp increase of mental constipation and unpredictability
in antitrust. Of the "incipiency" test, Bork says:
This verbal formula has proved meaningless. The fallacious economic theory
employed by the courts makes the problem of forecasting the relevant eco-
nomic events so intractable that there is no question of being able to estimate
degrees of probability or possibility. The result has been that any imaginary
threat to competition, no matter how shadowy and insubstantial, is sufficient
to satisfy the "reasonable probability test."u 6
By expanding the liability scope of attempt to monopolize the Commission
gives private plaintiffs a generous fishing license. According to the Report's
interpretation, the revision covers "unambiguously" anticompetitive behavior
regardless of the size of the defendant. It likewise embraces "ambiguous" conduct
where it constitutes a "dangerous risk" of monopoly, as measured by the defen-
dant's "probable" market power and "potential" anticompetitive effect of its
behavior. These are terms of considerable subtlety that would make it extremely
difficult to predict with confidence which forms of conduct are legal. An environ-
ment of unpredictability would be exploited by aggressive private plaintiffs, using
meritless allegations to harass defendants into risk aversion settlements.'
The failure to consider the role of the private plaintiff and the consequences
of the proposals on private enforcement is a serious defect. Two of the "sub-
stantive" proposals will aggravate problems of length and complexity in private
enforcement. Because of vagueness and a definite plaintiff bias, attempt to
monopolize is subject to abuse by private parties seeking to intimidate rivals.
Indeed, a strong proponent of the revision advised that in the hands of private
plaintiffs it could be used to "punish hard-nosed competition."" Softening the
standards for obtaining injunctive relief will increase reliance on Clayton § 7
allegations in resisting unfriendly takeover attempts. Since the "probability" of
a lessening of competition standard of Clayton § 7 furnishes a forum for the
most tenuous of claims, the market for acquisition of firms would be unnecessarily
impeded.
II. The Demise of Antitrust
The Commission acknowledges that it eschewed a broad examination of
the substantive rules of antitrust. This was likely due to the six-month time con-
straint. Unfortunately, the depth of the problems confronting antitrust is such
that anything less than a full evaluation of the antitrust system is of marginal
language is the same for all three laws. Illegality exists where the effect of the conduct "may
be to substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce."
16 R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 48 (1978).
17 Concern on this prospect was expressed by John Shenefield, head of the Antitrust Divi-
sion and Chairman of the Commission, who concluded that if "after Congressional examination,
there is concern that the legislation suggested here is susceptible to abuse by private plaintiffs"
he favors making the proposed provisions "applicable only to suits brought by the government."
Report, supra note 12, at 44 n.31.
18 Id. at 101 (Separate views of Commissioner Hatch).
[June 1979]
COMMENTARY
value. Regardless of time limitations, the Commission should have at least
acknowledged those problems whose cumulative effect has subverted antitrust.
The remainder of this Article addresses these issues.
A. Subversion of general principles
Ironically, the seeds of subversion were sown with what was thought to be
the Sherman Act's source of strength-open-ended statutory language setting forth
broad principles that could accommodate the evolving twists of the market
system. Thus Chief Justice Hughes once praised the Sherman Act for its "gen-
erality and adaptability."' 9  Subsequent events have made the inaccuracy of
the assumption all too evident.
In the 1911 Standard Oil"0 decision, Chief Justice White created the now
familiar "rule of reason" for evaluating restraints of trade. To White, the "rule
of reason" was a flexible guide for distinguishing restraints that harmed con-
sumers by producing higher prices from restraints with neutral or proconsumer
effects. Unfortunately, White's creative contribution ultimately became a con-
duit for conflicting and self-destructive value judgments.
Perhaps the most influential instance of subversion occurred in the 1945
Alcoa2 decision where Judge Hand held that Alcoa "monopolized" the alumi-
num industry by maintaining control of ninety percent of the market through
"exclusionary conduct." Hand balanced his provocative statement that monopoly
power is "always an 'unreasonable restraint of trade' ,22 by exempting the defen-
dant if success is due to "superior skill, foresight and industry."2 Without paus-
ing to define the terms of this critical qualification, Judge Hand piled on more
confusion by condemning Alcoa for engaging in "exclusionary conduct" by facing
"every newcomer with new capacity, already geared into a great organization,
having the advantage of experience, trade connections and the elite of per-
sonnel." '24
In the most significant challenge since Standard Oil, antitrust's response
to the issue of size was, at best, enigmatic. Consider Hand's legacy to the exec-
utive suite: management is encouraged to use "superior skill, foresight and
industry" to get ahead but can be held to have exercised "exclusionary conduct"
by utilizing experience, trade connections, and relying on elite management.
These two instructions continue to puzzle management, counsel, and courts.
Moreover, confusion was not restricted to the monopolization issue. With
a few gratuitous comments, Hand created an ideological discord that has serious-
ly, if not fatally, spifflicated antitrust. While acknowledging the relevance of
consumer welfare values, Hand shifted ideological gears to adopt sociopolitical
goals by observing that antitrust should be utilized: "to perpetuate and preserve,
for its own sake and in spite of possible cost, an organization of industry in small
19 Sugar Institute, Inc. v. United States, 297 U.S. 553, 600 (1936).
20 Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
21 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 '(2d Cir. 1945).
22 Id. at 428.
23 Id. at 430.
24 Id. at 431.
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units which can effectively compete with each other."25 With this observation,
Hand virtually destroyed the effectiveness of the "rule of reason" as a meaning-
ful legal principle.
The opinions of the Warren Court continued the erosion of traditional prin-
ciples. Perfunctory references to the free enterprise ethic ("it is competition"
the Chief Justice said in Brown Shoe, "not competitors, which the Act pro-
tects") 26 did not disguise the populist sociology that dominated a string of influ-
ential decisions. The Court enforced a civil rights code of conduct for the
marketplace that mandated equal opportunity for small firms, however inefficient
and regardless of the cost to competition and the consumer."
The reputation of Learned Hand, the influence of the Supreme Court, plus
personal predilections, prompted many lower courts to prefer sociopolitical con-
siderations over competition. Small firms are idealized, the preservation of local
communities is balanced in along with the rights of employees.28 One court
even thought it necessary to protect an inefficient management from takeover
by an "aggressive, fast-moving acquirer of many diverse businesses .
B. Exacerbation by the Government
The situation was further aggravated by the government's anticonglomer-
ation assault in the late 60's. Adroitly exploiting the judiciary's disenchantment
with the difficult task of plowing through the usual labyrinth of facts, the Justice
Department successfully introduced economic theory into antitrust. Courts
quickly perceived the benefits to be derived from using the Government's eco-
nomic models to justify presumptions of adverse competitive effects.2 The result
was the infusion under the "incipiency" test of exotic a priori doctrines capable
of proscribing mergers in any context and impossible to rebut. 1
The a priori doctrines were stretched beyond the edge of credibility in the
Marine Bancorporation2 case when the Antitrust Division argued that a merger
between two banks producing no present adverse effects nonetheless violated
Clayton § 7 because the acquiring firm is prevented from enhancing competition
sometime in the future by entering the market de novo.2 In a Catch 22 scenario,
a statute prohibiting a lessening of competition really means that a firm must, to
25 Id. at 429.
26 Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962). In the next breath the
Court said: "But we cannot fail to recognize Congress' desire to promote competition through
the protection of viable, small, locally owned businesses. Congress appreciated that occasional
higher costs and prices might result from the maintenance of fragmented industries and markets.
It resolved these competing considerations in favor of decentralization." Id.
27 See Kauper, The "Warren Court" and the Antitrust Laws: Of Economics, Populism,
and Cynicism, 67 MIcH. L. REV. 325 (1968).
28 See Bork, Antitrust in Dubious Battle, FORTUNE, Sept. 1969, at 103.
29 Allis Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. White Consolidated Indus., Inc., 414 F.2d 506, 525 (3d
Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1009 (1970).
30 See Austin, A Priori Mechanical Jurisprudence in Antitrust, 53 MINN. L. REV. 739
(1969).
31 See R. Bork, supra note 16.
32 United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. 602 (1974).
33 After attaching several qualifications to the government's theory, the Supreme Court held
the facts failed to support the allegations.
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avoid liability, merge to increase competition.34
'Under the leadership of a new Chairman supercharged with the populist
vision, the Federal Trade Commission fuels (or exploits) the ideological con-
fusion by advocating something called "humanistic competition." Efficiencies
and lower prices are secondary to a compassionate brand of "competition" that
gives priority to "ventures of small, human scale entities."35 Chairman Pertschuk
vows to sort out "vulnerable groups" such as children, minorities, the elderly,
and use the Commission's considerable powers to "protect" them from the evil
blandishments of the market system.
These factors have created an environment where enforcement by the gov-
ernment tends-or is perceived-to be arbitrary, result oriented, or outright
political. Enforcers seem to make negative value judgments on the merits of
conduct, then concoct liability theories. The potential competition assumptions
developed by the Justice Department fall into this category. The FTC's demand
for "humanistic competition" reflects the sociopolitical views of its Chairman
and a reformist constituency. Recently, the FTC revealed that it is looking for
candidates on which to test an "aggregate concentration" theory. A doctrine
that "involves not only the economic but also the social underpinnings of the
antitrust laws," aggregate concentration "looks to the effect of a merger not on
a particular market but upon the further concentration of assets and economic
and political power in the hands of the major firms in this country."3 Whether
the FTC has been charged with the responsibility to render judgments on the
appropriate sources and legal limits of "political power" is, to be generous, highly
debatable.
More important are the adverse effects of antitrust subjectivism on liti-
gation. The existence of conflicting ideologies makes it impossible to efficiently
conduct a case. Without the discipline of a lucid set of liability standards derived
from a single theory, almost any offer of evidence is admissible as "relevant."
Inevitably trials deteriorate into lengthy exercises in convoluted and somnific
debate that produce rooms of turgid testimony by "hired gun" expert witnesses.
So long as courts are confronted with a wide choice of ideologies, recommen-
dations to improve trial management will have trivial effect.
C. Adverse effects of private treble damage suits
The Commission's failure to examine the ramifications of the private action
cannot be justified. If for nothing else the sheer volume of private actions which
34 In 1958 Professor Rahl said: "Once again, we need to remind ourselves that the Clay-
ton Act does not deal with all kinds of possibilities, nor does it protect mere 'chance.' Further,
it does not prescribe a program for increasing competition. Its prohibition runs to conduct which
actually or probably lessens competition. To treat an election not to augment competition as a
lessening of competition is a neat trick, perhaps facilitated by the enveloping propensities of
the phrase, 'potential competition.' It is, however, plainly not authorized by the language of
the statute, nor by the philosophy of antitrust, which does not affirmatively seek to compel
competition." Rahl, Applicability of the Clayton Act to Potential Competition, 12 ANTITRUST
L.J. 128, 143 (1958).
35 Questions and Answers Composed by FTC Chairman Michael Pertschuk as Part of
Personal Appraisal of Antitrust Enforcement by FTC, ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA)
No. 832, F-i (Sept. 29, 1977).
36 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 891, A-17 (Nov. 30, 1978).
[Vol. 54:873]
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
far surpass the number of government complaints"7 demands attention. The fact
that private actions are a major contributor to litigation confusion and delay
makes investigation mandatory.
Sophisticated firms use the treble damage threat as a tactical weapon to
inhibit the competitive vigor of rivals. 8 While conducting business under the
vague principles of Judge Hand's Alcoa decision, large firms know that almost
every form of conduct involves a risk of being held to constitute "exclusionary
conduct." Exploiting the risk aversion that these firms have to the possibility
of paying treble damages,39 small firms are often successful in intimidating defen-
dants into modifying competitive behavior. For example, private plaintiffs have
sought to impose liability on dominant firms for the "surprise" introduction of
new products.
That risk aversion by management of large firms to the private action is
a rational judgment on the vicissitudes of antitrust gets support from the con-
troversial Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co." case. A small manufac-
turer of photographic products, Berkey charged that Eastman, "without adequate
notice to the industry" introduced a new "110 camera" system with the intention
of displacing Berkey and others from the market.
Eastman is the nation's largest producer of conventional film. In 1972
it introduced the "110 system," which included a new camera and film. Since
Berkey's processing facilities and cameras were not compatible with the "110
system," it necessarily lost business until it could make the appropriate techno-
logical adjustments. Berkey alleged that under these conditions the failure of
the defendant to "predisclose" pertinent information on the "110 system" con-
stituted monopolization. On this point, Judge Frankel approved a jury verdict
for Berkey by saying:
Treating this aspect of the claim, the court cautioned the jury that a com-
pany normally has a perfect right to keep its secrets, winning competitive
advantages by launching new and better products in its own way and in its
own time. Undertaking, however, to apply the teachings of the authorities
on Section 2 of the Sherman Act, the court went on to instruct that Kodak's
monopoly power in film, if it was found to disable competitors who could
not offer cameras comparable to Kodak's, might lead the judges of the
facts to decide that the failure to give camera makers the necessary predis-
closure concerning film should in all the circumstances be deemed anti-
competitive. These instructions applied to a record on which the jury could
readily have found among other things: [(1) the 110 system was used to
cope with competition, rather than the result of the pace of design revolution,
(2) there was no genuine improvement of benefits to consumers, (3) the
new products were inferior in important respects, (4) the new Kodacolor
37 See Posner, A Statistical Study of Antitrust Enforcement, 13 J. OF LAW & ECON. 365
(1970).
38 I have discussed this problem in depth in Negative Effects from Treble Damage Ac-
tions: The New Antitrust Strategy, to appear in a forthcoming edition of the Duke Lawjournal.
39 See Breit & Elzinga, Antitrust Penalties and Attitudes Toward Risk: An Economic
Analysis, 86 HARv. L. Rnv. 693 (1973); Mussman, Antitrust Risk Taking by the Executives,
44 ANTITRUST L.J. 394 (1975).
40 457 F. Supp. 404 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
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II was restricted to the 110 format, "for that anticompetitive purpose
alone. .... ]
Vibrations from Berkey resound loudly in the executive suite. Stunned by
a jury verdict trebled to over $80 million, many interpret the case as judicial
approval of Kodak's superior technology being forced to give in to a nebulous
duty of "predisclosure." ' 2 It is felt that enforcement of predisclosure will stifle
competition. Confronted with an unpredictable jury evaluation on the legality
of marketing new products, firms will, so it is argued, subdue innovation and
adopt conservative policies on the introduction of new technology. Moreover,
if a firm has the responsibility to share information, there will be less incentive
to invest in risky research. 3
Judge Frankel disagrees, saying that it is "neither accurate nor useful to
insist that the case stands for some vague, general requirement of predis-
closure."" To antitrust scholar Louis Schwartz the case requires no more than
drawing a line "between competing hard and resolving to throw a roadblock
in the path of your competitor. . .. ""
This sanguine interpretation misses the practical ramifications of a case
like Berkey. "Predisclosure," like possession of "the advantage of experience,
trade connections, and the elite of personnel" from Alcoa, is now perceived as a
situation involving serious danger of antitrust liability. Conditioned to the un-
certainties of antitrust, large firms will err on the side of risk aversion by pre-
disclosing. Therefore, as a practical matter, firms will indeed become more
cautious in introducing new technology. There is another point, subtle but im-
portant. Unlike the requirement of refraining from "exclusionary conduct" im-
posed by prior monopolization decisions, Berkey suggests that large firms have
a responsibility to "affirmatively" aid smaller rivals.
The long run effect of "affirmative protectionism" is that critical conduct
such as pricing and product innovation will be pacified. Moreover, when firms
are intimidated from normal expressions of competition, they are likely to go
"underground" by engaging in less beneficial forms of competition such as prod-
uct differentiation."
41 Id. at 414.
42 A Forbes commentator says: "This antitrust decision implies that any company in a
seemingly monopolistic position must give advance disclosure of any innovations or new
products to competition." FORas, April 17, 1978, at 27.
43 "But some legal observers-including a few who have no particular affection for Kodak
... see Berkey as a poorly managed company knocked out of the box by Kodak's superior tech-
nology and marketing skill. Kodak is being punished, they contend, for introducing inexpensive
pocket cameras and handy new flashbulbs without worrying much about how these innova-
tions would affect the profits of rivals. If every company with a dominant market position had
to consider how each new product might be interpreted by a judge or jury, the argument goes,
the incentive to innovate would.be severely crippled." Passell, Antitrust Out of Focus, N.Y.
Times, April 27, 1978, at 36. See also Clearwaters, Better Mousetrap Builder Beware, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 26, 1978, § F, at 14.
44 457 F. Supp. at 440.
45 Schwartz, Berkey-Kodak Verdict No Cause for Panic, N.Y. Law J., May 1, 1978, at 1, 2.
46 See Elzinga, Panel Discussion: Private Action-The Purposes Sought and the Results




A. The gaps in the Commission's Report
Either by design or because of time limitations, the Commission failed to
evaluate a group of factors that inhibit the efficiency and effectiveness of the
antitrust system. Ideological confusion which fosters indiscriminate use of a
priori economic theories and encourages efforts to bend the statutes to fit pre-
conceived judgments on conduct is the primary cause of waste and delay in
administering antitrust. Until these conflicts are confronted and satisfactorily
resolved, improvements in trial management will have peripheral effect.
The failure to evaluate the Robinson-Patman Act" sidesteps the Commis-
sion's responsibility to recommend substantive revisions that would expedite
complex litigation. Arguments over the effectiveness of this statute have raged
for years."s A growing group of observers agrees with Professor Levi's view that
the Act "tends to be a price-fixing statute hiding in the clothes of anti-monopoly
and pro-competition symbols."49 More germane to the Commission's work is
the Act's substantial contribution to delay and waste of judicial resources. As
"one of the most tortuous legislative pronouncements ever to go on the statute
books"5 it mystifies courts and counsel, thereby prolonging litigation with its
unfathomable twists. In addition, its unpredictability is easily exploited to harass
defendants with meritless claims.51
The Commission's revised attempt to monopolize test has a plaintiff bias
that will encourage nuisance and anticompetitive suits. Introduction of a vague
"incipiency" liability standard will force confusion among the judiciary. The
threat of liability for "potential" anticompetitive behavior will increase manage-
ment's risk aversion to private actions and encourage medium-sized and dominant
firms to adopt "soft" methods of competing.
The most serious defect in the Report is its silence on the effects of private
enforcement. The Commission should have heard evidence on the use of pri-
vate actions to inhibit risk-averse rivals from engaging in aggressive competition.
An effort should have been made to ascertain the extent to which the judicial
system is burdened with frivolous private claims. Finally, the record would have
been enhanced by addressing the arguments of those who suggest that the dis-
economits in private litigation are substantial enough to justify repeal of Clayton§ 452
47 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1970).
48 See R. POSNER, THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT: FEDERAL REGULATION OF PRICE DIF-
FERENCES (1976); Elias, Robinson-Patman: Time for Rechiseling, 26 MERCER L. RaV. 689
(1975).
49 Levi, The Robinson-Patman Act-Is It in the Public Interest?, 1 ANTITRUST L.J. 61
(1952).
50 J. DIRLAM & A. KAHN, FAIR COMPETITION: THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF ANTITRUST
POLICY 119 (1954).
51 In recommending that trial judges be given discretion to double or triple damage awards,
the 1955 Attorney General's Report expressed concern over "unwitting violators" being trapped
by antitrust. "This is especially so in the Robinson-Patman Act area where, in some instances,
violations can hardly be predicted." REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NAT'L COMM. TO
STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAWS 378 (1955).
52 On the basis that fines rather than private reparations would be more efficient in deter-
ring violations, Breit and Elzinga advocate exclusive reliance on government enforcement. Breit
& Elzinga, supra note 39, at 693-96.
[June 1979]
COMMENTARY
B. The rehabilitation of Antitrust
Can antitrust be rehabilitated? Maybe, but drastic surgery is necessary.
The first step is to repeal the right of private parties to assert antitrust claims.
This eliminates the opportunity to use the treble damage action for anticom-
petitive purposes and removes countless meritless and time-consuming complaints
from the court docket. It also erases the origin of much of the intellectually
irrational case law. In addition, use of the government as the exclusive antitrust
advocate would provide an advocate to present the courts with a coherent policy.
Congress could prevent the government from indulging in exotic a priori
theorizing by eliminating the existing ideological confusion. Consistent with the
congressional intention standing behind the Sherman Act,5" the statutes should
be interpreted to prohibit only those restraints that inhibit price competition and
impede efficiencies. Reliance on sociopolitical value judgments should be
expressly rejected. A succinct amendment reaffirming the competition ethic
would stabilize judicial inquiry by providing a guide to the admissibility of evi-
dence. A cluster of rational and unambiguous precedent would soon emerge.
It would also put a stop to the FTC's efforts to subvert antitrust with its market-
place egalitarianism.
Section 2 of the Sherman Act should be repealed. Seldom invoked, section
2 is the source of tension, controversy, and diseconomies. It produced the Alcoa
decision and its fuzzy sociology. Most importantly, Sherman § 2 brings disrepute
to antitrust in its inability to handle the monopoly problem.
The chief response to Sherman § 2's impotence is "no-fault" liability. Con-
duct is irrelevant; size is the violation and illegality is presumed once the govern-
ment proves that the defendant controls a designated share of the market. Some
proposals allow defenses, such as economies and possession of patent monopoly. 4
Debate over "no-fault" generally centers on two points: (1) will elimination
of the necessity to prove "exclusionary conduct" reduce the length of litigation,
and, (2) is there sufficient empirical evidence to support the assumption that
large firms are invariably poor performers? Unable to reach a consensus judg-
ment on "no-fault," the Commission asked Congress to examine the issue.55
A "no-fault" statute is not a convincing solution. Opponents persuasively
argue that since evidence of conduct would be necessary to determine the rele-
vant market and establish the economies defense, litigation time would not be
reduced. Professor Bork argues that a "no-fault" statute would operate to the
detriment of consumer welfare since size in most cases is achieved through
efficiencies and superior performance.5 " Another negative trade-off is that the
threat of automatic liability for size would inhibit the entrepreneurial spirit17
The implicit asumption by many "no-fault" supporters is the populist
myth that "bigness" is inherently "evil," regardless of performance. The "devil
theory" of corporate take-over of the political system is refuted daily by the
53 R. BORK, supra'note 16, at 50-71.
54 For the most thoughtful "no-fault" recommendation see C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER,
ANTITRUST POLICY: AN ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ANALYSIS 44-99 (1959).
55 Report, supra note 12, at 45-49.
56 R. BORIC, supra note 16, at 175-97.
57 Report, supra note 12, at 102-04 (Separate views of Commissioner Hatch).
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countervailing power of government interference, labor, and an army of reform
groups. As Bain observes: "Reversion to a more primitive sort of democracy
would require much more than just a reduction in business concentration."58
Finally, the concept of "no-fault" is simplistic in that it ignores the reality
of the large enterprise competing in an economy that is more international than
domestic. Defendants in government monopolization suits will always be sub-
stantial participants in the national and world economies. At this level, the issues
are more macro- than microeconomic. Inflation, the balance of payments, inter-
national trade, and national security, rather than effects on competition in partic-
ular markets will determine the appropriateness of dissolution.59
The government's monopolization case against IBM6" is a classic example
of antitrust struggling with national interests and the priorities of an international
economy. Dissolving IBM raises a serious risk of adversely affecting the world's
leading producer of the computer-the most important product of the post-
World War II society. Leonard Silk states the problem: "Should the United
States, for the sake of preventing monopoly, break up a company that helps to
sustain America's role in the world economy?"'" Fortune worries that dissolution
would "run counter to broader public interests" because it would weaken the
U.S.'s "technological leadership."62
Use of the anti-monopolization statute is impractical and counterproduc-
tive. Allocating maximum enforcement resources to ferreting out "conduct"
violations such as price-fixing would produce a "cleaner" market than presently
exists and thereby encourage firms to compete on the merits. If government
enforcement is effective, and a firm does achieve size, it would likely be the
result of efficient operation or due to the myriad forms of government inter-
ference.
Attorney General Griffin Bell's suggestion that Congress assume responsi-
bility for dissolution of large firms deserves serious consideration. 3 One possible
arrangement is to charge the Senate Judiciary Committee with the responsibility
to identify any firm whose size might be detrimental to national interests. "Na-
tional interests" would include both micro- and macroeconomic factors, and
could include political judgments on the appropriate role of size in a democracy.
Hearings would develop the credibility of a proposed sanction and expose the
possible consequences of dissolution. The testimony of interested third parties,
such as labor and rivals, would provide an added dimension.
If the Committee found compelling reasons for dissolution, a bill of partic-
ulars would be drafted for presentation to the Senate. The bill would describe
the reasons for the Committee's recommendations, along with an impact state-
ment. The impact statement would summarize the potential consequences of
58 J. BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 92 (2d ed. 1968).
59 Senator Javits, a member of the Commission, complained that the Report failed to study
the interaction between antitrust and international competition. Report, supra note 12, at 110
(Separate views of Commissioner Javits).
60 United States v. I.B.M., 69 Civ. 200 - Div. No. 72-344 (D.N.E.).
61 Silk, Break Up I.B.M.? N.Y. Times, Oct. 23, 1972, at 31.
62 Beman, I.B.M.'s Travails in Lilliput, FORTUNE, Nov. 1973, at 148, 162. A Barron's com-
mentator complains: "Like the statutes which spawned it, the antitrust case against IBM has
lost all touch with reality." Barron's, Aug. 21, 1978, at 7.
63 Wall St. J., Aug. 29, 1977, at 3, col. 4.
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the proposed remedy. It would then be up to the Senate to pass judgment on
the Committee's recommendations. The Justice Department would be charged
with the responsibility for implementing the dissolution decree.
This proposal anticipates a substantial commitment of time and resources.
Given the stakes involved, thorough evaluation is justified. Moreover, the entire
process would not exceed the amount of time the Justice Department has already
expended in prosecuting the IBM and ATT extravaganzas and the FTC on the
Exxon and Cereal complaints.
